๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Interven
Admin

Team & Roles

Invite users to your Interven tenant. Choose between Admin / Developer / Reviewer / Auditor roles.

Every tenant supports multiple users with role-based access. Set up at Settings โ†’ Team Management.

Roles

RoleReadWriteBest for
AdminEverythingEverything (users, billing, env, integrations)Tenant owners / security leads
DeveloperActivity, agents, policies, tools, API keys (own only), inbound routesPolicies, tools, own API keysEngineers integrating agents
ReviewerActivity, approvals, incidents, agents, policies (read), inbound routes (read)Approvals (approve / deny), incident notes & transitionsOn-call security analysts
AuditorActivity (with sensitive headers redacted), approvals (history), incidents (history), policies, agents, tools, audit log + compliance evidence exportNothing โ€” every mutation endpoint returns 403SOC 2 / PCI / HIPAA auditors during a review window

Role checks run at both the BFF (Console) and the gateway (API) layers โ€” there is no client-side-only protection.

Inviting users

/settings/team/invite

  1. Email โ€” must be valid; can be any provider unless you've restricted via OIDC SSO
  2. Role โ€” pick one (you can change later)
  3. Send invite โ€” they receive an email with a link to set their password

The invite link is single-use and expires in 7 days. Re-invite if needed.

OIDC SSO (optional)

When configured, only users with email addresses on the configured domain(s) can sign in via OIDC. Configure at Settings โ†’ SSO:

  • Google Workspace โ€” provide the OIDC client ID + client secret + allowed domain
  • Microsoft Entra ID โ€” provide the tenant ID + client ID + client secret

Once SSO is on, you can still keep the password fallback for break-glass accounts.

SAML / SCIM provisioning is on the Enterprise roadmap. Contact sales if it's a procurement blocker.

What each role can't do

Developer can't:

  • Invite / remove users
  • Change billing / plan
  • Mint API keys for other users' default agents
  • Modify the tenant audit-log retention window
  • See or rotate tool credentials

Reviewer can't:

  • Modify policies (only read)
  • Mint or revoke API keys
  • Edit or revoke inbound routes
  • See full unredacted sensitive headers in traces

Auditor can't:

  • Mutate anything (every POST/PATCH/DELETE returns 403)
  • See Tool Credentials, API Keys management, or Alerts configuration in the sidebar
  • See the full value of any secret-class header

The Auditor role in practice

When SOC 2 / PCI / HIPAA auditors need read-only access to your tenant during a review:

  1. Settings โ†’ Team โ†’ Invite
  2. Email: their email
  3. Role: Auditor
  4. Send a separate notice that you've granted access (the auditor confirms before logging in)
  5. After the review is over, revoke their access

What they see:

  • โœ… Activity, Decisions, Traces, Approvals (history), Incidents (history), Policies, Agents, Tools, Inbound Routes (read), Settings โ†’ Audit Log โ†’ Compliance evidence export
  • โŒ Tool Credentials, API Keys management, Alerts config, Settings โ†’ Team / Billing
  • โŒ Every mutation endpoint โ€” including "approve this approval" โ€” returns 403

The auditor pulls their own evidence. You don't have to export and email files.

Audit of role changes

Every role assignment, role change, user invite, and user removal writes a row to the audit log with:

  • Operator (the admin who made the change)
  • Target user
  • Old role โ†’ new role
  • Timestamp

This is part of the standard audit log export.

API access

Team management has API endpoints if you need to provision programmatically โ€” for example to invite users from your IDP via a cron:

  • GET /v1/users โ€” list tenant users
  • POST /v1/users/invite โ€” send invite
  • PATCH /v1/users/{id}/role โ€” change role
  • DELETE /v1/users/{id} โ€” remove access

These endpoints require Admin role + a separate admin-scoped API key (mint at Settings โ†’ Team โ†’ "Admin API key"). Standard iv_live_* keys do not have team mutation scope.